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ASPECTS OF POST WORLD WAR II GROWTII IN
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES* 
Simon Kuznets 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we deal with selected aspects of economic growth 
since World War II in developing (less developed, or LDC for short), 
contrasted with developed (or DC) market economies, excluding the 
centrally planned or Connnunist countries (which in 1972 accounted for 
some 1.2 of 3.7 billion of world population). 1 This exclusion is due 
partly to difficulties of securing comparable .and meaningful estimates 
for these countries, particularly for the giant among them, Mainland 
China: but largely to problems involved in the analysis of economic 
growth in countries in which the trade-off between economic gain (in 
output or power) and individual welfare and freedom is so different 
from that in the less centralized market economies. 
The LDCs are the countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
that are characterized by low income per capita and a production 
structure that suggests a marked shortfall in exploiting the opportunities 
provided by modern technology. According to the World Bank Atlas, of 
the 1. 85 billion people in the "developing" countries in 1972, close to 
1 billion were in countries with an average per capita GNP of $110, and 
another O. 2 7 billion were in countries with "middle income" i.e. , a 
range of per capita GNP between $200 and $375, and an average of $260. 
By way of contrast the average per capita incoille for developed or 
industrial market economies, with a population of 0.66 billion,was over 
$3,500. 
2 
United Nations estimates, a major source of comparative data, 
*Preliminary draft of a paper to be presented at a conference at
Vanderbilt University in late 0ctober, 1975. 
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differ in detail of classification from those of the World Bank; but 
for our purposes, which involve general orders of magnitude rather than 
detail, the two sets of estimates are fairly comparable. 
Our interest is in the growth of the poor LDCs. Not all the 
countries classified as "developing" by either the World Bank or the 
United Nations are poor, the striking exception being the oil sheikdoms 
with small populations and enormous oil revenues. Nor are all the 
countries classified as "developed" rich, as illustrated by several 
morecountries in Southern Europe. There is a twilight zone where a 
discriminating classification would place countries that are backward 
but rich, those that are in the process of .movement from LDC to DC 
status but have not yet attained the latter, and still others that may 
have regressed from apparent DC status (possibly illustrated by Argen­
tina). But these intermediate or mixed groups do not loom large enough 
within the LDC or DC categories to modify substantially the broader 
parameters of size, structure, and growth - particularly when we emphasize, 
as we should, the population weights in any aggregation of countries for 
establishing the growth of total and per capita product for large groups. 
The broad topic covers a wide field, for which, over the last 
quarter of a century, an enormous body of data, both descriptive and 
analytical, has accumulated. Indeed, it is hard to exaggerate the 
explosive acceleration in the flow of data and range of studies in this 
field, which before World War II was not of primary interest even for 
the developed countries and practically neglected for the rest of the 
world. No single scholar can deal with it either comprehensively or with 
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full balance, and particularly within the limitations of time and space 
warranted on this occasion. The discussion that 
follows represents an individual's reflections on some of the questions 
raised by the broader type of aggregative evidence and analysis. 
2. Diversity and Aggregation 
For the LDCs as a group, the United Nation has estimated 
annual growth rates of total and per capita GDP (at constant factor 
prices), from 1950 to 1972. 3 The growth rate of per capita product 
was 2.5 per~~nt per year from 1950 to 1960, and 2.7 percent from 1960• 
to 1972; and the combined rate for the 22 years was 2.61 percent per 
year. If this rate were sustained, per capita product would double 
in about 27 years; and the implication is that between 1950 and 1975 
per capita product must have risen by about 90 percent. For the 
poorer and most populous LDC region distinguished in the UN estimates 
back to 1950, East and Southeast Asia (excluding Japan), with a 
population by 1972 of over 1 billion, the growth rates in per capita 
product for the same two periods were 1.9 and 2.2 percent respectively, 
yielding a combined rate of 2.04 percent--which implies a rise of close 
to two-thirds over 25 years and a doubling in a period somewhat short 
of 35 years. 
Such growth rates are quite high, in the long-term historical 
perspective of both the LDCs and the current DCs. While the historical 
data for the LDCs rarely provide a firm base for judging their long-term 
growth, the low levels of per capita product that characterize these 
countries in the early 1950s and even in the early 1960s clearly imply 
that rates of growth that mean doubling in a period from 27 to 35 
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years could not have prevailed in the long-term past. For such rates, 
if applied to the years before the 1950s, would have meant impossibly 
low levels of per capita product and c~sumption at the beginning of 
the preceding quarter of a century. And for the current DCs, for 16 
of which we have measures of long-term growth, the observed rates are 
generally well below those cited for the LDCs in the paragraph above. 
For periods extending from at least half a century to the long period 
of their modern economic growth, Sweden, over the last century, and 
Japan, back to the late 1870s, are the only two of the 16 countries 
with growth rates in per capita product that approached or slightly 
exceeded 29 percent per decade. Indeed, they are the only countries 
with growth rates above 22 percent per decade (unless one counts Italy, 
back to 1895-99, with a rate of 23 percent). 4 
If growth rates in the per capita product of LDCs over almost 
a quarter of a century were so impressively high, one may ask why the 
reaction to them, in the general flow of news about these countries, 
in the persistent concern about critical conditions with respect to 
supplies of economic goods, seem to ignore these growth achievements. 
The news, reactions, concerns, are not sufficiently tangible to be 
susceptible of easy quantification, and one cannot measure this state 
of concern and response sufficiently to be able to see how they reflect 
economic movements of the magnitude cited here. It may well be that 
a rise in expectations has produced a negative reaction to economic 
attainments, which otherwise might have elicited litanies of praise 
for economic "miracles." And indeed references have been made to 
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such miracles for some limited periods and countries, in contrast to 
the more prevalent references to acute problems in the LDCs, and the 
recurring flurries of concern among international agencies and 
developed countries over economic deprivation and dangers of collapse 
in the "third" world. Perhaps the emphasis on the flow of news on the 
troublesome rather than favorable items in the stream of current events, 
combined with the easier accessibility and wider communications, 
introduced a bias in recent decades that tended to conceal economic 
advance of major proportions. Still, even if we find, as we may later, 
grounds for inferring that there has been a change in expectations, 
and hence in the bases for evaluating the adequacy of modern economic 
growth, we should still examine critically aggregative measures of the 
type noted above. They may conceal more than they reveal, and the 
various kinds of aggregation that yield such measures may contain 
biases that should be identified, and their magnitude should at least 
be suggested. 
This examination cannot deal with the question of accuracy of 
the basic underlying data, country by country, or even for a selected 
sample. The question is particularly relevant to the statistics of 
the LDCs, where the brevity of the period over which basic data have 
been collected and the limited scholarly resources for their analysis, 
combined with the difficulties of proper quantification of processes 
that do not naturally yield measurable results, limit the accuracy and 
adequacy of the data. And part of the problem lies in a system of 
national accounting concepts and classifications which is poorly 
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fitted to the economic life and experience of the LDCs. But, taking 
note of the limitations, we assume that the basic data, while crude, 
are of the right order of magnitude for broad findings and inferences-­
at least as plausible hypotheses, subject to test and revision as 
better data and study lead to an improved foundation. 
The measures just cited, and widely used, are results of 
aggregation of: (i) populations, either within or among countries and 
regions, the products of whose economic activities are pooled together; 
(ii) the outputs of the several production sectors viewed as 
contributions to, and the different uses of product viewed as 
drafts upon, that common pool of product; (iii) the movements of 
total product, or its parts, in relation to population, over the 
shorter periods within the total time span for which we derive the 
average growth rates. Because the measures are comprehensive in 
their coverage of product, of the relevant populations within and 
among countries, and of the different segments of the time span, the 
resulting aggregat~ are effective summaries of the net result of a 
wide range of interrelated activities over a long span of historical 
time. But the synthesizing function of such aggregation may (a) involve 
sacrifice of important differences and variability; and (b) be 
attained along differing lines and with differing costs. These two 
aspects of aggregation and of the resulting measures are now briefly 
discussed, with particular reference to the economic growth of the 
LDCs since the early 1950s, and to the apparent puzzle set forth at the 
start of this section. 
7 
(a) Since the growth rate of say 2.6 percent per year in per 
capita GNP for 1960-72 (derived for some 67 LDC countries, each over 
a million population in 1972, and omitting major oil exporters, a few 
still in colonial status, and a few affected by current wars in 
Indochina) is an average, it may easily be the result of a combination 
of some countries with no growth and even a decline, with others having 
high growth rates. And, indeed, the World Bank Atlas, from which the 
average above was derived, lists LDCs with a total population close to 
100 million, with a per capita growth of less than 0.5 percent per year, 
and some of them showing no rise or even decline (Bangladesh, Ghana, 
Afghanistan, Senegal, for example}. At the other end, eleven LDCs with 
a population close to 120 million have growth rates of 3.5 percent 
per year or more, and their average (weighted by population) is 5.1 
percent. Diversity of behavior within a comprehensive average is only 
to be expected; but this diversity in the growth records of the LDCs has 
some distinctive aspects, which will be considered after a brief comment 
on the implications of aggregation among sectors and over time. 
Changes in per capita gross product are combinations of 
changes in per capita product of each of the~ production sectors, 
appropriately weighted by the share of each sector in aggregate output. 
The important point to note in this connection is that the growth rate 
of the A sector (agriculture and related industries) has been markedly 
lower than that of the I sector (industry, including mining, manufac­
turing, utilities, construction, and transport and communication) and 
of the S sector (services, including trade, government, professional, 
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and personal services). Moreover, in relation to total population, 
i.e., on a per capita basis, the growth of a basic products sector 
like agriculture has been low. Thus, based on United Nations data 
for developing countries, for 1950-72, and calculated from quinquennial 
averages, the growth rate for per capita GDP over the twenty-two year 
period averaged 2.3 percent per year; but for the output of the A sector 
5
the average was only 0.56 percent per year. This finding of a low 
growth rate of agricultural output per head in the LDCs is corroborated 
by a recent study by the U. S. Department of Agriculture, which shows, 
for 1954-73, an annual rate of increase in per capita production of 
foods of 0.4 percent per year for the developing countries (compared 
6with a rate of 1.5 percent for the developed countries). 
Short-term changes in subperiods of the time span for which 
the average growth rate is calculated do not necessarily cluster closely 
around the average. This is particularly true when total product 
comprises major sectors in which vagaries of weather from year to year 
may affect output (as in the case in so many LDCs), or when it is subject 
to short-term strains of changing markets and demand (as is the case in 
the smaller LDCs that rely heavily on export). Thus, even for a very 
large region, such as East and Southeast Asia, the indexes of GDP per 
capita, which rise over 1960-72, show a drop of stability from 1964 
through 1966, and from 1971 to 1972 three out of the twelve annual 
changes, while in two others the change was a rise of only slightly 
over 1 percent. The record for Africa, excluding South Africa, shows 
two declines in per capita GDP, one no-change, and two rises of barely 
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1 percent (see YNAS 1973-III, Table 6b). For ind.ividual LDCs, sharp 
declines in aggregate product per capita and longer stagnation periods 
can easily be found within the twenty-two to twenty-five period spans. 
Diversity in per capita growth rates among countries and 
population groups within countries, in the growth performance of 
different production sectors, and in the records for shorter subperiods 
within the total time span, could have been expected. However, some 
aspects of this diversity among the LDCs in the past quarter of a century 
are distinctive. 
First, there is a clear suggestion that among the LDCs the com­
bination of very low and even no growth at all in some cases with a high 
average per capita growth rate is a common occurrance. This diversity 
in growth performance is far more striking than among the DCs. Indeed, 
of the eighteen DCs listed in the World Bank Atlas (we excluded 
Puerto Rico), with a 1972 per capita GNP ranging from about $2,000 (for 
Italy) to about $5,600 (for the United States), not one shows a per 
capita growth rate for 1960-72 of less than 2 percent per year (the 
lowest was New Zealand, with 2.1 percent); and with the exception of 
Japan and Israel, both of which had rates well above 5 percent, the 
range was from 2.1 to 4.7 (the average for all DCs, for 1960-72, shown 
by United Nations, was 3.8 percent per year, see YNAS, 1973, III, 
Table 4b). In general, the world of the LDC market economies seems 
much more diverse than that of the DCs--in the range of per capita 
product from less than $100 to over $700, in the duration of their 
existence as independent, sovereign states, in size, and in what might 
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be called the distinctive long-term conditions that determined their 
historical heritage. The DCs, with their income range from about $2 to 
less than $6 thousand, with their common origin within the framework 
of European civilization (except for Japan), and with the common impress 
upon them of the social and economic effects of modernization and 
industrialization, exhibit far less diversity. 
Indeed, one could argue that diversity among the LDCs widened 
in the post World War II period, if one can reasonably compare the 
situation with the earlier decades when most of the independent 
sovereign states of today in Africa and Asia were colonial possessions 
of Western powers. The multiplication of new sovereignties, in large 
numbers and at different dates, with varying degrees of preparedness 
and with diverse historical heritage that conditioned unity within and 
viability without of the new states of such different size and endowment, 
would in itself add to diversity in growth performance over the last 
two to three decades--setting aside the differences in purely economic 
factors. The difficulty that many of the new states faced in attaining 
lasting consensus and unity, and still do, needs no proof. It is evident 
in the incidence of civil conflicts and wars and the widespread imposition 
of a military dictatorship as a last recourse in stabilizing internal 
conditions to permit peace and some growth to occur. One could thus 
argue that the impressive rise in the average growth rate of per capita 
product among the LDCs, perhaps partly associated with the spread of 
political independence, has been accompanied by an almost inescapable 
widening of diversity in the growth rates among these countries. Since 
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the number of the units that have become independent sovereignties has 
increased tremendously,but at different times, during the last twenty­
five years, it is not surprising that diversity in growth performance 
among periods has also grown. Stagnation or decline during some 
difficult political or other phase was followed by an accelerated 
growth, at historically phenomenal rates, during the next subperiod. 
Second, the particularly low growth rate in per capita 
output of the agricultural sector, and the wide contrast between it 
and the growth rates of the I and S sectors, raise questions that 
are specially relevant to the LDCs. To begin with, such differences 
mean that the weighting of the sectors in arriving at the aggregate 
growth rate is important. If the price structure is such that the I 
and S prices relative to A prices are higher than in the world markets, 
the I-S weights are exaggerated and the aggregate growth rate is 
biased upward. A more critical factor is the susceptibility of the 
A sector to short-term fluctuations, to diversity of its short-term 
growth exper:i.ence among regions of a large LDCs, since it is the major 
provider of the consumption needs of the populous low income strata 
within any LDC. Thus, a low growth rate of the per capita output of 
the A sector is associated with recurring declines or stagnation of 
the per capita supply of foods, in conditions in which such recurrent 
crises pose major organizational and political problems--and one need 
not go far to find examples in recent years. The possible concurrent 
growth of industrial output or the S sector at a high rate, total and 
per capita, is not an effective offset. It is only an indication of 
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the continuity in building the non-agricultural framework to higher 
levels, and would be fully warranted only if long-term recovery of 
the A sector or long-term prospects of adequate substitution for the 
domestic supply of the A-goods can be expected. Here again, the 
natural diversity in the conditions of the A sector augments the 
diversity of aggregate growth experience among the LDCs. 
Third, as already suggested, initial per capita product of 
most populous LDCs was, and is, quite moderate. With the usual 
internal inequality in the distribution of income within the countries, 
per capita levels were low indeed for large population groups. Hence, 
inadequate growth or regression, discontinuities over time, are 
particularly costly in terms of human welfare--as they need not be 
in countries with relatively high per capita product and economic and 
social reserves for coping with short-term recessions or growth 
retardation. If diversity has been fairly wide among the LDCs, in 
growth rates over the full span, in variability of rates from subperiod 
to subperiod, particularly in the A sector, the combination of a high 
average growth rate for the all-embracing group of all LDCs with a 
flurry of crises and deprivation problems affecting now some, then 
other, members of the group, can be taken as "normal". The broader 
implications of such partial and temporary crises, particularly for 
policy choices and understanding of the immediate past and the proximate 
future, must be inferred from weighing of crises and deprivations 
against possible gains in the longer run. Such a calculus, admittedly 
difficult, is required if longer-term policy and prospects are not to 
be distorted by mis-interpretation of partial and temporary difficulties. 
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(b) Given diversity in growth rates of per capita product 
among the LDCs and their populations, or among sectors within a 
country, or variability of both sets of growth rates over subperiods, 
the proper choice of weights used for aggregation and averaging is 
important. The weights implicit in these summarization processes 
must, therefore, be examined for their effect on the averages of the 
type used above to initiate the discussion. 7 
If the levels of per capita product of the several population 
groups (within countries, or among countries or regions) differ at the 
start of the growth period, and if the growth rates of the per capitas 
also differ, the average growth rate for the aggregate will be much 
affected by the weights used. In the conventional calculations, of 
the type used by the United Nations, the sum of all products is related 
to the sum of all populations at the beginning and end of the growth 
period; and the average growth rate is calculated from the changes 
between the initial and terminal ratios (or along a straight line 
fitted to the annual ratios). In this procedure the average growth 
rate is affected by: (a) differences in the increase of populations 
with different levels of per capita product, so that if the population 
of richer LDCs grows relatively more than that of the poorer, the 
average growth rate in per capita product will be raised; (b) weights 
for the separate population groups, which are the size of population 
multiplied by per capita product, or total product. Neither implication 
of the procedure is defensible. Pooling among the LDCs, which would 
make the greater population growth of the richer countries meaningful to 
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the poorer, is non-existent. And there is no reason to assign greater 
weight to the per capita growth rate of a richer country than to that of 
a poorer. A more defensible procedure would be to hold constant the 
shares in total population of groups or countries with different initial 
product levels; and, particularly, to weight each country's or group's 
growth rate in per capita product by population, not by product. Indeed, 
for more plausible welfare connotations, one might argue that the growth 
rates in per capita product for the poorer countries should be weighted 
by their population raised by a multiple over 1.0, and for the richer 
countries, by their population lowered by a multiple less than 1.0. 
The distinction between the conventional and the population­
weighted averages of growth rates is of particular relevance to the 
experience of the LDCs in the last two to two and a half decades. During 
this period the richer of the LDCs (largely in Latin America)had the 
higher rate of population growth; and even more important, the richer 
LDCs showed higher growth rates in per capita product than the poorer 
LDCs, the latter largely in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, 
the conventional procedure yields an average growth rate in per capita 
product for the LDCs as a group that is biased upward. With the structure 
of recent growth experience as noted above, the adjustment based on 
the use of constant population weights is sizeable. Thus, for the 67 
LDCs covered in the World Bank Atlas for which we used growth rates of 
per capita GNP for 1960-72 (see discussion above), and for which 
per capita GNP ranged in 1960 (in 1972 prices) from about $60 to about 
$500, the conventional calculation yields an average growth rate of 
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2.62 percent per year. The use of the 1960 population weights yields 
an average growth rate in per capita product of 2.01--a reduction of 
close to a quarter. Similarly significant differences are shown in the 
paper cited in footnote 7. 
If growth rates in per capita output of the various sectors 
differ, with that in the contribution of the A sector particularly low, 
the weights of the rapidly and slowly growing sectors obviously 
affects the combined product growth rate even for a single country; 
and we have already alluded to the possible adjustment for over­
valuation of the industry and service sectors relative to that of 
the agriculture sector. But even more far-reaching questions arise 
concerning the character of some of the rapidly growing sectors -­
questions that have been discussed for decades in the national income 
literature. If the share of government (among other services) has 
grown as it has in so many LDCs in recent decades, indicating a higher 
than average growth rate for that particular subsector, and if much 
of it was for development of administrative, defense, and similar 
maintenance functions, one could view these outputs as intermediate-­
as costs of operation, not as final product. With the resulting 
narrower and purer definition of national product, the growth rate of 
the aggregate-in which a rapidly growing subsector was now assigned 
a weight of zero--would presumably be reduced. And this is in fact 
the result if we limit national product to the outputs of the A and 
sectors, and either omit the S sector completely or reduce its weight 
substantially as compared with its weight in conventional national 
I 
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economic accounting (some illustrations are provided in the paper in 
footn0te 7, in particular Section 4). 
There is a related argument in connection with the variability 
of growth rates in total per capita product or important components, 
over short subperiods. The argument is that an average growth rate over 
two decades of say 2 percent per year means one thing when the annual 
changes within the period range from 1.7 to 2.3 percent per year, and 
another when declines in several of the annual intervals are offset by 
higher than average rates in other intervals. The difference, of course, 
lies in the special difficulties created by variability over time, 
particularly in the output of final goods required for "basic" needs, 
and by changes that are non-systematic and hence not easily foreseen. 
One could argue that in averaging annual changes over the span of two 
decades, the annual declines should be given greater weight and the high 
offsetting rates given lower weight than their mere arithmetic value-­
all of this compared with standard weights that would be attached to 
annual changes that are identical with, or close to, the simple average 
value over the full period. Use of such a weighting system would 
clearly reduce the averages for those LDCs for which the record shows a 
combination of annual declines or small rises in some intervals with 
explosively high rates in others--and these would be LDCs in which 
agriculture, sensitive to vagaries of weather,is of great weight,or 
the large number of those which, during the period since World War II, 
had major difficulties in establishing a peaceful and viable national 
state. 
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Even this brief note on the effects of diversity and variability 
on aggregation and averaging-for the LDCs suggests a Pandora's box of 
difficult and question-provoking adjustments. It is impossible here, 
and would be difficult elsewhere, to approximate and test the magnitudes 
of the warranted modifications. The illustrative calculations in the 
paper mentioned above, which did not touch on effects of the variability 
of growth rates over time, reduced substantially the aggregate average 
growth rate for per capita product of the LDCs (limited to East and 
Southeast Asia and Latin America). For the period 1954-58 to 1964-68, 
the conventional rate of some 2.0 percent per year dropped to between 
1.1 and 1.4 percent (see Table 9 of the paper cited in footnote 7). 
And the effect is all the greater, because for the DCs the application 
of some of these adjustments raised rather than lowered the average 
growth rate in per capita product. 
With no way of advancing the subject further, one may conclude 
with three general observations. First, the diversity and variability 
in the growth patterns of the LDCs, or within the individual countries, 
are an important datum in judging the significance of the averages for 
the LDCs as a whole, both for translating the current changes into long­
term trends and for any gE!neral hypotheses about fact©rs affecting the 
economic growth of the LDCs. Second, the conventional aggregates and 
averages tend to exaggerate, to bias upward the composite measures for 
the LDCs--which they do not do for the DCs--the main reason being that, 
at least over the last two decades, the poorer LDCs showed lower growth 
rates in per capita product and more vulnerability to variability over 
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time than the richer LDCs, an association not found among the DCs. 
7hird, the completely adjusted purified growth rates in per capita 
product among the LDCs may prove to be higher than that which 
prevailed among them in the past--and perhaps not inferior to similarly 
adjusted pre-World War II long-term rates among the current DCs. But 
this last suggestion is only a plausible guess, and would require 
testing after the implicit conceptual questions have been resolved. 
3. Population Growth and Institutional Innovations 
The growth of per capita product among the LDCs was attained 
in decades marked by a high rate of population increase. According to 
the annual indexes of total and per capita GDP, available from the 
United Nations for 1950-72, for the LDCs as a group (conventional 
procedure) the growth rate for the 22 years was 2.53 per year; that of 
population--2.43 per year; and that of total product--5.03 per year. 8 
For the DCs the same series show a growth rate of per capita product 
of 3.29 percent per year, of population only 1.09 percent per year, 
of total gross domestic product 4.42 percent per year--or almost a 
third higher, or less than a half, or about a tenth lower, respectively 
than those for the LDCs. 
It thus appears that failure of the growth rate, conventional 
or adjusted, in per capita product of the LDCs to keep up with, let 
alone move toward, that of the DCs lies in the much higher rate of 
population growth in the former. And one can easily calculate that with 
the same growth rate of total product, but much more moderate rate of 
population increase of say 1 percent per year, the rate of increase in 
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per capita product for the LDCs would climb to almost 4 percent per 
year. Or, as has often been said, population growth has been eating 
up the fruits of the growth of product, leaving a small residual for 
the rise in per capita income. 
Whatever our judgment of the threatening implications of 
population increase in the LDCs for the longer-term future, the 
suggestion that the high rate of population growth is an explanatory 
determinant of the moderate growth in per capita income is both easy 
and misleading. In and of itself, the rate of population increase 
is an inadequate explanation of either the success or failure of 
growth measured on a per capita level. In this connection the 
population growth variable is significant largely in that it reflects 
the institutional and social conditions of a country. 
To begin with, the higher rate of population growth of the 
LDCs than of the DCs is a recent phenomenon: for decades before the 
1930s, and back -to the early nineteenth century, the rate of the former 
was markedly below that of the latter. 9 To be sure, this was due to a 
much higher death rate in the less developed regions, which kept the 
rate of natural increase down despite fairly high crude birth rates-­
an extremely inefficient method of population control, and one that 
could not contribute to social and-economic productivity. But it is 
important to recognize that only in the 1930s, and especially after 
World War II, the LDCs began to show significantly higher population 
growth rates than the DCs; and that while some birth rates did rise, 
the trend was due largely to a rapid reduction of death and morbidity 
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rates--one of the first requirements of, and a most important and 
valuable ingredient in, modern economic growth. 
Second, if population, viewed as a collective of consumers, 
grew more rapidly in the LDCs, and thus can be debited with a greater 
proportionate draft upon the fruits of economic growth, it also grew 
more rapidly as a collective of potential workers and should be 
credited with a greater contribution to total product. The source in 
footnote 9 shows that for a less developed group of regions (Africa, 
Latin America, and South Asia), whose total population grew from 1.08 
billion in 1950 to about 1.75 billion in 1970, or at an annual rate of 
2.43 percent, population aged 15-64 and thus classifiable as the 
potential labor force grew from 602 to 940 million, or at a rate of 
2.24 percent per year. In the developed regions, including North 
America, Australia-New Zealand, Japan and Europe, excluding Eastern 
Europe, total population grew from 563 to 701 million, or at an annual 
rate of 1.1 percent and so did the population aged 15-64, rising from 
361 to 449 million (see Tables 2 and 8, pp 7 and 18 of the source). 
Thus the rate' of growth of population of working age in the LDCs was 
more than twice that in the DCs; and one may ask why these additional 
workers could not have contributed at least to about the same proportional 
rise in product per capita in the two groups of countries. 
Third, while in comparing LDCs and DCs as groups, we find 
that a higher rate of population•increase in the former is associated 
with a lower growth rate of per capita product, at least for the past 
two to two and a half decades, this association does not hold for 
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the individual countries within the LDC group. Using the 67 LDCs, with 
their records for 1960-72 found in the World Bank Atlas, we classified 
them by their rates of population increase over these twelve years, which 
averaged 2.5 percent per year (weighted by 1960 population). For twenty­
nine, not counting India, the growth rate of population was 2.5 percent 
or less. Their population was 356 million in 1960, and their population­
weighted average growth rate in per capita income was 2.1 percent per 
year. India, with a 1960 population of 432 million, had a growth rate 
of population of 2.3 percent per year and of per capita product of 1.1 
percent. In the remaining 37 countries, with a 1960 population of 413 
million, the growth rate of population was more than 2.5 percent per 
year, and the population-weighted growth rate of per capita product was 
2.9 percent per year. Thus, the association among the LDCs between 
the rate of population increase and the growth rate in per capita 
product was, if anything, positive rather than negative--reflecting 
in large part the difference in growth rates between Latin America and 
the other LDC regions. It would not be difficult to suggest specific 
explanations, but the finding is cited merely to indicate that over 
recent decades other factors tended to outweigh the high rates of 
population growth, at least among the LDCs. 
Fourth, the acceleration in the rate of population increase 
in the LDCs has been marked because the rate of decline in the death 
rates was extremely high--about five times as fast in the two to three 
decades as the decline of mortality rates among the DCs in their 
population-transition phase. And since the decline in birth rates 
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has lagged behind that of death rates in the past experience of the 
currently developed countries, it is assumed that the lag in the case 
of the LDCs is only to be expected. But historical analogies may be 
misleading; and unless there is a tested explanation and an indication 
of the operative mechanism, references to lags are just descriptions 
of still to be explained events. This connnent is particularly relevant 
because in many LDCs in Latin America long-term declines in death rates 
have been accompanying long-term rises in per capita product, and yet 
there has been no indication of a responsive fall in crude (or age-of­
women standardized) birth rates. 10 One would expect that thirty to 
forty years of substantial decline in mortality, including that in 
infant and children's mortality, would lead-to some contraction of 
birth rates, assuming that the high level of the latter in the past may 
have served in part to offset the deaths of infants and young children. 
The persistence of high birth rates, therefore, calls for an explanation. 
Some tentative hypotheses to try to account for the persistence 
(and components) of high levels of fertility in the LDCs in recent decades 
have been presented elsewhere. 
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But they should be summarized here, if 
only because they interpret the patterns of demographic behavior as 
reflection of economic and institutional conditions that have a major 
bearing on economic growth in the LDCs. 
The relevant hypotheses were noted under three broad heads: 
technology of birth control; possibly lower costs of bearing and rearing 
children in the LDCs; possibly higher returns from larger numbers of 
children in the LDCs. The technology of birth control was viewed as 
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affecting some segment of the population of the LDCs, the group that 
wishes to have fewer ch~ldren. However, even for this group, a variety 
of birth control methods, which, in the long-term past, had led to 
control of population numbers (e.g., postponing the age of marriages of 
females) were still available. Since the groups did not have to depend 
on the modern means, the significance of the technology factor is 
reduced. Nor is it clear that the desire for fewer children affects a 
substantial proportion of the population of the LDCs in their child­
bearing ages. The lower absolute costs of children in the LDCs are 
clearly recognized; but one may question whether these costs, relative 
to the economic level of the parental population, are so low, compared 
with their costs in the nuclear families of the developed countries. 
Furthermore, costs cannot be effectively discussed without consideration 
of returns, and it seemed warranted to place the burden of explanation 
on the returns from children. The implication then is that in the LDCs, 
families, in their own responses, and possibly reflecting the norms of 
blood-related collectives and societies wider than the family, view 
children as an investment, as a source of wealth, defined broadly as 
economic and social power--in the conditions, determined by economic 
and social institutions, within which they live. 
Two aspects of this investment in children are spelled out 
in quotations from the paper cited in footnote 11. "One is the 
economic, labor pool aspect, the desire for more children because under 
the rural or small family business conditions of the LDCs, children 
are a supply of labor at the disposal of the family that, after some years, 
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provides economic savings and advance far greater than any that could 
be generated by the same family unit with fewer offspring." The second 
aspect of investment in children may be designated the genetic pool 
aspect, relevant to those societies among the LDCs in which economic and 
social mobility is blocked by monopolization of economic and social power 
by a few families. Hence limiting the number of children and giving them 
greater training or education is no assurance of future economic or 
social rise. "Under such conditions, advance for the offspring of the 
lowly is a matter of success based on personal characteristics or 
endowments, on a kind of genetic lottery that may turn up a dictatorial 
corporal or general, or a successful athlete, or the female consorts of 
either, so prevalent in many LDCs." Here a rational calculation would 
call for as many children as will survive to maturity, as many more 
tickets in the genetic lottery. 
The third, and perhaps most far reaching, aspect of the 
investment in children is that of security--not merely or primarily the 
economic security of parents who, in their old age, have to rely on 
the help of surviving children, but much broader, encompassing protection 
against natural and social calamities, protection not provided by the 
government or other, not blood-related organs of society. The pressure 
in many pre-industrial societies (e.g. for centuries in China) for 
larger families and a wider blood-tie group has been associated with the 
weakness of the government, and the need to rely on family ties for 
security of the individual members. So long as governmental and other 
non-blood-related organizations remain weak in this respect, an adequate 
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increase of those related by protective blood-ties will be a high 
priority goal, despite possible short-term disadvantages. 
Two aspects of these tentative hypotheses advanced to explain 
the ·high fertility levels in the LDCs, and thus their high rates of 
population growth, should be noted. One is that emphasis on returns 
from children as the main factor is corroborated by the structural 
characteristics of the high fertility rates in the LDCs, to which the 
main burden of the paper just cited is devoted: the entry of females 
into marriage at early ages; the continuation of childbearing to much 
more advanced ages of married women than in the DCs; the importance of 
high parity births; and the high proportion of children born to aged 
mothers and particularly to aged fathers (beyond 40 years of age)-­
despite the presence of a number of surviving siblings. All this seems 
to suggest, although it does not prove, that the production of large 
numbers of children is a systematic and planned activity, rather than 
a reflection of impetuous and uncurbed passion or of blir1d adherence 
to some traditional and increasingly irrational pattern. 
The second, and more important, aspect of the hypotheses, is 
the emphasis on fertility rates as rational responses of the population 
to the economic and social conditions, implying that major declines in 
fertility are not likely until these conditions are changed. 12 The 
emphasis is then on economic and social structure, and the key factor 
suggested as setting limits to the economic growth of the LDCs is then 
the capacity of the societies for the kind of institutional innovation, 
for changing the existing economic and social institutions so as to take 
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advantage of the potentials ·of modern, i.e., more advanced technology. 
In their specific form, these potentials would differ from country to 
country depending on the historically conditioned endowments and the 
changing stock of available technology. 
This implication is of particular relevance in the present 
connection. It may be amplified by suggesting that just as population 
growth cannot be treated as an exogenous variable determining growth 
rates in per capita product but must be viewed as the result of human 
decisions in roughly rational response to economic and social conditions, 
neither can we assume that there are some rigid technological constraints 
on the growth of the LDCs that would explain their limited achievements 
in the way of increased per capita product in the recent past. In 
particular, one must resist the tempting argument that because these 
LDCs are poor, they cannot generate sufficient savings to finance the 
capital formation necessary for higher growth rates. The proportional 
magnitude of material capital required for growth rates higher than those 
achieved would not be large even in economies with relatively low product 
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per capital-if a backlog exists in technological opportunities, and 
effective utilization of productive factors is assumed. With flexibility 
of factor proportions, facilitated by choices in the rate of utilization 
of both capital and labor, relatively low capital-output ratios can be 
attained. Of course, an abundance of capital can be used in a trade-
off for greater inefficiency; but this possibility does not justify the 
view that capital shortages are a key factor in limiting growth rates 
in the LDCs. That view is widely prevalent, despite the experience of 
not a few LDCs that managed to reach high levels of growth in per capita 
product with high rates of population growth and with adequate domestic 
savings proportions, low average incomes notwithstanding; and despite 
similar experiences in the past of a number of current DCs. 
One must look then for the key factor in the capacity of LDCs 
to adjust their economic and institutional structure in order to provide 
optimal, or at least adequate, channels for growth. Such adjustments 
may easily be constrained for non-economic reasons, for example by 
resistance to the abandonment of wasteful practices that have assumed 
quasi-religious significance, and represent no special interest of any 
group. Or it may be that institutional changes affect adversely some 
groups while benefiting others, and the consensus for such changes is 
absent. Or it is possible that a higher rate of economic growth, with 
its disruptive (as well as productivity-raising) effects would, if 
forced, upset the basic consensus and threaten the unity of the country, 
causing unavoidable delays in economic advance. 
For this reference to innovations in economic and social 
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institutions, and to the difficulties of sustaining them, to be more 
than a shift of focus to a rather vague concept of "capacity for 
modernization," calls for careful examination of individual LDCs. By 
this approach, those countries that have delayed the adjustment, that 
have adopted limited growth-promoting policies, that have not removed 
the obstacles to an effective program, and those that have suffered 
breakdowns,can be compared with others of apparent success, and their 
specific antecedents to that success. Such an attempt would have to 
rely on the rapidly growing literature on the LDCs, whose diversity 
was emphasized earlier; and is certainly beyond the scope of a brief 
summary. One may still argue that, barring conditions of political 
subjection, a sovereign less developed economy, seen as a unit in a 
diversified world and with many technological opportunities, cannot 
properly be viewed as having the limits on its growth set within 
reasonable magnitudes, by factors exogenous to its economic and social 
conditions--i.e. either in its genes, or in its demography, or in some 
aspect of technology (with possible exception of Eskimos in the Arctic 
wilderness, or nomads in the desert). And one can cite evidence from 
both recent and past history on the difficulties that the currently 
developed countries in the 19th century past had in organizing themselves 
for modern economic growth--establishing a unified state that could 
channel such growth effectively. If one thinks of the rapid succession 
of internal conflicts in the two recent decades--in Pakistan, in 
Nigeria, in the Congo, in Ethiopia; the rapid changes in political regimes, 
frequently ending in military dictatorships or one-party government, in 
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many LDCs, including those in Latin America, which have been politically 
sovereign for many years--one can see that setting and maintaining the 
bas'ic conditions for economic growth is a demanding and never-ending task: 
The solutions of this task can vary greatly in terms of adherence to or 
principles highly prized by many societies (individualsacrifice- of 
liberty, equality, or cooperation in loss and gain). It is the difficulty 
of easing this task that must be identified, in the first instance, as 
the proximate cause of the shortfalls in growth among the LDCs, shortfall 
that may be viewed as avoidable. 
The difficulty is exacerbated by two consequences of the low 
per capita product of the populous LDCs. One, already noted, is 
vulnerability to short-term calamities--due to dependence upon less 
advanced agriculture, and greater difficulties in coping with natural 
disasters (earthquakes, floods, etc)--because of lack of reserves that 
could be utilized to deal with crop failures and other disasters, and 
weakness of transport and other means of mobilization. The other 
consequence that deserves mention is the technological distance_ between 
the low-income and even middle-income LDCs and the developed countries 
from which they could borrow technology and secure assistance. The 
technological distance means that while, in general, there is a 
substantial backlog of accumulated technology that has not been exploited 
in the past by LDCs, the current supply of technology and technological 
opportunities available in the DCs may be of little value to the LDCs. 
They, to illustrate, may need better small-scale transport or economical 
water pumps rather than complex computers, nuclear installations, or 
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supersonic airplanes. The flexibility of choice of capital and labor 
apparently open to the LDCs may thus be limited by the non-availability 
of a better technology that would suit their particular needs, and the 
scarcity of technical talent to generate the adaptive uses of whatever 
can be effectively borrowed from the DCs. 
These two consequences provide a partial explanation of the 
finding that the poorer LDCs in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, with their 
low per capita incomes, showed a lower growth rate of both total and 
per capita product than the richer LDCs, particularly in Latin America 
(excluding the oil rich units from all groups). It is ouly a partial 
explanation, because so many LDCs in the Asian and African regions 
have only recently attained their political independence. Many of 
these faced particular difficulties in establishing a unified, and 
viable, new political entity, with an incidence of civil conflicts and 
political breakdowns; and in some of them the resulting constraints 
upon economic performance and growth have continued. But even allowing 
for these major struggles in initial national formation, it may stilJ. 
be true that the greater vulnerability of the lower income LDCs and 
their greater technological distance from the DCs contributed to a 
lower growth rate in recent decades than that of these LDCs, whose 
higher initial per capita product and a greater extent of industrial­
ization reduced their vulnerability to short-term calamities and made 
adoption of modern technology easier. 
4. Evaluation of,and Response to, Economic Growth 
Assume that, with the adjustments suggested in Section 2, 
the.growth rate in per capita product of the LDCs over the last quarter 
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century averages between 1 and 1.5 percent per year, which means a 
total rise over the period of between 28 and 45 percent. Consider also 
that an increase in real return per head is indicated by such evidence 
as the marked reduction in death rates over the period by between a 
quarter and a half; rising per capita consumption; and higher levels 
of education and health. Has an evaluation of, and response to, this, 
undeniable, economic advance of the LDCs, and for most of them after 
a long period of stagnation, been affected by changed expectationsi 
And if so, why and how did expectations change? 
In observing evaluation of economic growth in the DCs, three 
characteristics can be suggested, at least as related to modern economic 
growth. First, growth appears larger in prospect than in retrospect: 
quantity indexes weighted by beginning-of-period prices yield appreciably 
higher rates than the same indexes weighted by end-of-period prices. 
This difference is due to the fact that new, innovation-related products 
are priced much more highly in the earlier years --before their wide 
spread and rapid growth, and the associated improvement in efficiency 
and reduction in costs--than in later years when these products become 
cheaper quasi-necessities. Second, all innovation-powered economic 
growth eventually generates problems of adjustment and undesirable 
externalities--many unforeseeable in the early stages, because of 
inadequate knowledge of the properties of the technological innovation 
and of the social innovation that it may bring into being. This is 
an almost inevitable result of some "new11 elements in an innovation, 
which by definition is a venture into the partly unknown. Third, 
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since current events are always much more heavily weighted than past, 
the evaluation of economic growth tends to be biased downward, in the 
deflation of the initially high values of the positive contribution of 
innovations and in the concentration on the current problems generated 
by them. The beneficiaries of electric power or of the internal 
combustion engine, for example, tend to take them for granted, while 
justifiably complaining of either pollution or failure of centralized 
sources of energy affecting millions of people. They forget the older 
days of confinement in equally or more polluted cities without a chance 
to escape to the suburbs,or of dependence on sources of light and energy 
far less efficient than centrally provided electric power. Similarly, 
in the field of health, the beneficiaries of reduced mortality in the 
younger ages are concerned over the degenerative diseases of older 
people, and over the prolongation of life t,) ages when it can be neither 
pleasant nor productive. 
If tempered by consideration of the longer-term contribution 
of past economic growth, such emphasis on current problems, such an 
implicit downward bias,may be justified. It is a necessary stimulus for 
overcoming the problems, or at least mitigating their effects. But the 
important point is the relevance of these observations to the view held 
by the LDCs of their economic attainments and growth in relation to their 
distance from the DCs. For with respect to the latter the LDCs are, in 
a way, like earlier versions of the DCs, the earlier generations of the 
latter who appraise growth in prospect rather than in retrospect, and 
the price weights of the LDCs are an analogue of the beginning-of-period 
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prices used in weighting the quantity indexes. This analogy is confirmed 
by the recent study of comparative purchasing power on an international 
scale cited in footnote 2. To illustrate, when we compare consumption 
per capita in India and the United States, using Indian price weights, 
the ratio of quantities (India to US) is 1 to 22.2; whereas when we use 
the US price weights, the ratio is 1 to 12.0 (see source~ Table 13.5, 
p. 174). Similar results can be found for the US-Colombia and US-Kenya 
binary comparisons. In other words, the LDCs, using their own standard 
to evaluate the levels of the DCs appraise them more highly and find 
the distance to them greater than would the DCs, using their standard 
and appraising the distance to the LDCs. Likewise, one could suggest 
that not having fully experienced modern economic growth, the LDCs are 
much less aware of (or concerned about) some of the maladjustments and 
negative externalities that it brings in its wake. Thus, 
the LDCs would evaluate growth much more highly than the DCs. Further­
more, if in their evaluation of their own growth at least a part of the 
yardstick is formed by the attainments of the DCs, the distance to be at 
least partially reduced and the gap to be closed loom wide indeed. 
We come now to the question as to the bases of evaluation 
of economic growth in the LDCs, evaluation within those countries as 
to the adequacy or shortfall of the growth attained. As already indicated, 
we deal here with intangibles, not susceptible of quantification or hard 
evidence (at least not at hand). Yet the judgment involved is an important 
factor in the response to economic growth that has already occurred, 
possibly inducing change-provoking action if growth is found to be 
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significantly short of the minimum goals. In concluding this paper, it 
would be tempting to speculate on the yardstick, the expectations, that 
may be applied, and on the changes in such expectations that may have 
occurred in recent decades. But even such speculation involves review 
of various goals--some competing, some complementary (greater output, 
more equity, minimum assurance of defense power in the divided and 
hostile world, adequate individual freedom, and so on)., and this is 
beyond my scope and competence. 
Instead, one may point out some aspects of the evaluation and 
possible response that are apparent from the discussion. First, if in 
evaluating economic growth, the emphasis is not so much on the rise that 
may have been attained but on the distance to some minimum goal, the 
judgment will depend on the distance between the goal and the initial 
economic position of the country; as well as on the tolerance of 
interruptions and delays. To illustrate: if a country begins with a per 
capita product of $100, and has also previously suffered from short-
term failures, the goal of growth may be set at $500 as a desirable level 
that would also act as protection from short-term disasters or, at 
least, minimize their impact. If then it is assumed that a fair target 
is to reach this level in fifty years (or thereabouts), an average growth 
rate in per capita product of about 3. 3 percent per year is expected. 
If, over a twenty-five year period, growth has, in fact, raised per capita 
product by 50 percent, the movement was only an eighth of that necessary 
to cover the total distance--even with the target remaining fixed (and it 
is likely to move upward over time). For such a calculation the comparison 
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of the actual growth rates in the LDCs, either with those in their own 
past or those in the past records of the DCs, is not relevant. In the 
past of these LDCs, particularly those that were not free to plan their 
own destinies, such economic goals were overshadowed by the goal of 
political freedom and independence. And in the past history of the 
current DCs, even of the follower countries, initial levels were much 
higher (except perhaps for Japan) and the distance between these levels 
and the goals set was narrower--so that the growth rates viewed as 
feasible and acceptable might have been distinctly below those that the 
recent post-World War II growth experience warranted. 
Second, the same applies to distributive aspects of growth, 
to effects on inequality in the distribution of returns--which we did 
not touch upon partly for lack of space, but largely for lack of 
reliable data--despite prolific discussion in the recent literature. 
If the goal is to avoid, with given aggregate growth, deterioration of 
economic position of large, lower income groups, the requirement of some 
significant advance applies not only to the country as a whole, but to 
sub-groups of the population. The failure of crops affecting farme!s, 
or unemployment and underemployment affecting large proportions of 
the labor force augmented by rapid population growth, represent shortfalls-­
even if the over-all advance of the country may have been impressive by 
past standards. 
Third, it may be realistically argued that the,expectations, 
the yardsticks by which economic growth is evaluated, have changed in 
recent years. Goals are more ambitious and delays are less well 
36 
tolerated than probably was the case in the pre-World War II past. The 
increased technological power of man, and the rapidity with which 
devastated countries recovered and forged ahead after World War II, the 
success in reducing and wiping out disease and ill-health the world over, 
and the high rates of economic growth achieved by so many countrie~ had 
an effect similar to that ushered in by modern economic growth when it 
emerged in the pioneer and early follower countries in the late 
eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century. The effect was 
to strengthen the view of man as the creator of his destiny, of the vast 
potential power of man's advancing knowledge in providing economic 
abundance, once the needed adjustments of social structure were made; 
and in the widening ties of communication in the world, to spread the 
view to countries that had previously failed to exploit adequately the 
potentials of modern technology. These two strains--of the dominant 
power and potential of modern technology (and of the stock of useful 
knowledge behind it) and its accessibility to any human society willing 
(and presumably capable) to make the needed adjustments in social 
and economic structure to channel this power properly--have certainly 
been strengthened and spread more widely in the world in the post 
World-War II decades both, by a denser network of communication and by 
examples of extraordinarily high economic performance bordering on 
miracles. 
Fqurth, the spread of political independence to so many 
national units in the world, which proceeded at such a phenomenally 
rapid rate after World War II, and is still continuing, created that 
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many more foci of responsibility for economic growth. It proceeded on 
the tacit assumption, sometimes overt in the propaganda literature for 
political freedom, that the new sovereign powers would be capable of 
adequate response to the challenge of economic growth--or would, at 
least, be more responsive than when they were colonies. In that sense, 
adequate economic growth was viewed as a promise, as a first priority 
task, by those many and populous LDCs that attained sovereignty only 
after World War II; as it has become for all states, 
with the recognition that it is the social 
response--not natural resource, not genetic endowments, not even the 
existing stock of material capital--that is crucial. In the case of 
the poorer LDCs, the challenge was, of course, much more acute, because 
they lacked reserves for ameliorating the effects of short-term relapses 
and of temporary stagnation. 
Fifth, the multiplication of sovereign units represented, and 
naturally contributed to, the strengthening of nationalist tendencies 
and positions in the world--if only as a matter of establishing more 
firmly the new identities and developing a consensus on the basis of 
a feeling of common belonging. But this was also a divisive tendency; 
and in the newly established national units there has often been room 
for strife within (among divergent, ethnic, tribal or religious groups), 
and for conflict without. Economic growth was, consequently, sought 
to provide not only adequate economic returns to the population but 
also the sinews of strength in establishing viable unity within the 
country and in assuring an adequate defensive posture vis-a-vis the 
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outside. The intensification of industrialization in many LDCs, 
particularly the larger ones, sometimes to the neglect of agriculture, 
was clearly motivated by the need for some minimum domestic supply of 
tools that, however'useful in peace, were indispensable in case of 
armed conflict. And this made judgment of adequacy of economic growth 
dependent not merely on progress towards peaceful goals, but on its 
provision of the minimum power for self-protection in a divided and 
hostile world. 
These brief comments, which could be elaborated by numerous 
illustrations taken from the record of.events in the last few years, 
are sufficient to indicate that the :~valuatipn of economic growth 
attainments in the LDCs, by the people involved (in so far as one can 
judge from the outside), may be in terms of high expectations, of 
yardsticks that involve fairly ambitious goals. It is the application 
of such yardsticks that may explain the tension and strain, the search 
for modifications of national and international structures. This would 
be only a natural response to the Judgment of inadequacy of the growth 
attained so far, and given the dominant theory that potentials of modern 
technology and modern economic growth are accessible and available once 
the necessary modifications of economic and social structure, at home 
and abroad, are made. 
Such a response is not without danger. If economic growth 
problems of the LDCs can effectively be met only by changes in internal 
social and economic structure, and possibly even require changes in 
the international framework that channels relations between the LDCs 
39 
and the rest of the world, it is also true that each change or 
modification has its specific cost--short-term for the groups that are 
affected adversely, and long-term for the whole society. And no calculus 
is available for measuring the balance of costs and gains, short-and 
long-term, in order to provide guidance in seeking to maximize returns 
for the society or societies involved. 
The difficulty is that economic analysis of economic growth, 
in terms of inputs and outputs, both the conventional and the more 
expanded (including inputs into human capital, valuation of leisure, etc.), 
is still too limited to encompass the costs and returns from modifying 
the economic institutions, let alone the social. How do we value the 
cost of shifting from the status of independent worker to that of employee 
--even if we can estimate the difference in average income? How do we 
measure the costs of displacement of rural population from the land and 
of the migration to the cities for a long period of acclimatization and 
adjustment to urban life? Or in the case of more violent modifications 
of social structures, how do we compare the costs of forceful re-education 
campaigns (including concentration camps) with the additions of a fraction 
of a growth rate in GNP, or in the product of heavy industry? The questions 
are not irrelevant, for these various alternatives have in f~ct been 
followed, with differing results in terms of conventional economic product, 
yet they obviously represent situations in which even the expanded 
economic calculation yields only a narrowly partial answer. And 
emphasizing such analyses, as something we can do, in the hope that they 
will shed some light on some aspects of the problems, may mean a dangerous 
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neglect of unmeasured major factors. We would, thereby, provide badly 
biased answers, for situations in which the total costs are markedly 
different from those measured. 
Since the widespread and far-reaching change in economic and 
social structures is a condition, part and parcel of modern economic 
growth, economic analysis of growth in its present state is severely 
limited. However, this is no argument either for neglecting the need, 
in a variety of situations, for such economic and social changes; or 
for not pushing the study of economic growth toward a broader approach 
in which the application of quantitative analysis and direct consideration 
of the changes, past and present, in the institutional framework could 
be combined. Even if the combined measurement of economic costs and 
costs of social change may prove impossible, the very identification 
of changing aspects of social and economic institutions should be helpful, 
both in refining the narrower economic analysis and in widening its use 




The figure, for "centrally planned economies" is from the 
World Bank Atlas: Population; Per Capita Product, and Growth Rates, 
(Washington, 1974), p. 8 
2These estimates of per capita GNP in US dollars are based on 
modified or unadjusted exchange rates, and tend to exaggerate the 
contrast--compared with the results of detailed adjustments of local 
currency estimates for purchasing power parity. Yet one should not 
assume that such far reaching adjustments reduce the gap to a narrow 
range. A recent elaborate study yields some illuminating results (see 
Irving B. Kravis, Zoltan Kennessey, Alan Heston, and Robert Summers, 
A System of International Comparisons of Gross Products and Purchasing 
Power, published for the World Bank by The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, 1975). In a comparison of India and the United St.ates, 
to take an extreme example, the conversion by exchange rates yields a 
ratio of per capita GDP of 2.04 to 100 (for 1970); that using per capita 
quantity indexes based on international prices, yields a ratio of 7.12 
to 100 (see Table 1.3, p. 8). This is the largest proportional adjustment 
of the ratios (3.5 = 7.12/2.04). Similar results for Kenya and Colo•bia 
are 1.9 and 2.3 respectively. If we assume a proportional adjustment of 
about 2.5 for all low income LDCs relatively to all DCs, the ratio 
indicated in the World Bank Atlas ($110 to $3,670, or 0.029) would rise 
to 0.072 and the range between the per capita product of the two groups 
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of countries would still be 1 to 14. A range of this extent surely 
warrants consideration of the implications of the low per capita 
product of the LDCs for the vulnerability of their economies to short­
term crises, and for the meaning of even relatively high rates of 
growth in their per capita product. 
3
The estimates for 1950-1960 are from United Nations, 
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969, Vol. II, International 
Tabies, (New York, 1970), Table 4b; those for 1960-72 are from 
United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, Vol. III, 
International Tables, (New York, 1975), Table 4b. These volumes are 
referred to briefly as YNAS, 1969, II; and YNAS 1973, III. 
4 see Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations, Harvard 
University Press, (Cambridge, 1971), Table 1, pp. 11-19. 
5The underlying annual indexes of gross domestic product at 
constant factor costs, total and per capita, and of output in the 
several sectors, particularly the A sector, are from Table 6b of 
YNAS 1969, II and YNAS 1973, III. The earlier volume is used to compute 
quinquennial arithmetic means of the indexes for 1950-54, 1955-59, 
and 1960-64, from which the growth rates for the first two quinquennial 
spans are derived. The later volume is used for 1960~64, 1965-69, and 
1970-72, from which the growth rates for the quinquennium 1960-1964 
t::, 1965-69, and the four year period from mid-1965-69 to mid 1970-72 
are derived. The averages cited are the geometric means of the growth 
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rates for the four intervals, with due regard to the shortness of the 
last interval. 
6 
see United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign 
Agricultural Economic Report, no. 98, The World Food Situation and 
Prospects to 1985, Washington, Dec. 1974), p. 12. The classification 
into the developing and developed groups is similar to that of the 
United Nations, but nonmarket economies are included. 
7several of the points raised here have been discussed in 
greater detail in my paper, "Problems in Comparing Recent Growth Rates 
for Developed and Less-Developed Countries," Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, vol. 20, no. 2, January 1972, pp. 185-209, reprinted 
in Simon Kuznets, Population, Capital, and Growth: Selected Essays, 
W.W. Norton (New York, 1973), pp. 311-342. 
8For the sources and procedure in calculating the·growth 
rates see footnote 5. 
9
For a convenient summary of the long-term population growth 
estimates see United Nations, Background Paper for the Bucharest World 
Population Conference, Demographic Trends in the World and its Major 
Regions, 1950-1970 E/Conf. 60/CBP/14 (April 1974, mimeographed), 
Table 1, p. 5. The table shows world population estimates by John 
Durand back to 1750, linking after 1900 with those of the United Nations. 
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Footnote 9 (continued) 
Although non-market economies are included, and the distinction between 
less and more developed regions differs slightly from those used above, 
the results would not be changed even with adjustment to our classifi­
cation, and exlusion of Communist countries. 
lOA valuable collection of long-term series is found in 
O. Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in Latin America: New Estimates of 
Historical Trends and Fluctuations, Institue of International Studies, 
University of California, Research Series no. 7 (Berkely 1965). Two 
monographs by Eduardo Arriaga, in the same research series, provide 
valuable data and discussion on death rates and their declines. They 
are: New Life Tables for Latin American Populations in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries, Research Series no. 3 (Berkeley, 1968); and 
Mortality Decline and Its Demographic Effects irt Latin America, 
Research Series no. 6 (Berkeley, 1970). 
11 
see my paper, "Fertility Differentials between Less 
Developed and Developed.Regions," to be published in Proceedings of 
American Philosophical Society in late 1975. 
12
Lest it be thought that continuation, for some time, of 
high rates of population growth prove impossible because of physical 
or technological limits, it should be noted that the United Nations 
population projections do envisage such trends for the remainder of 
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Footnote 12 (continued) 
this century. Yet these projections of population volumes are 
considered sustairtable--barring, of course, catastrophes of the nuclear 
holocaust type--with declining death rates. The brief explanations of 
the assumptions in the two sources cited below clearly indicate the 
implications, and the key roles particularly of those relating to the 
modernization of the economic and social structures. 
The magnitudes projected should be noted--using the "medium" 
(of several) variants that can be viewed as more plausible than the 
others. In World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1968 (New York, 
1973), the population of less developed regions (defined again to 
include South Asia, Africa and Latin America), which grew at the rate 
of 2.8 percent per year in 1965-70,would keep growing at roughly the same rate 
to 1985 , and then the rate would gradually decline to 2.2 percent by the. 
end of the century. For the developed regions (defined to include 
Europe, excluding Eastern Europe; North America; Japan; and Australia-
New Zealand), the growth rate for 1965-70 of close to 1 percent would 
remain at that level to 1985, and then decline to 0.8 percent by the 
end of the century. The stability, at high levels, of the growth rate 
for the LDCs through 1985, is the result of a decline in birth rates 
offset by an almost equal decline in crude death rates (e.g. for South 
Asia a decline in birth rates from 44 per thousand in 1965-70 to 
37 per thousand in 1980-85, almost matched by a decline in death rates 
from 17 to 11 per thousand for the same two quinquennia, ibid. Table 
A.3.1, p. 68), with the further decline in birth rates outweighing the 
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Footnote 12 (continued) 
diminishing decline in death rates. For the DCs, the movements of 
crude birth and death rates are much slighter,as is the change in the 
absolute level of the low rate of population increase. 
In World Population Prospects, 1970-2000, as Assessed in 1973, 
working paper, mimeographed, ESA/P/WP/.53 (New York, March 1975), the 
1970 population totals have been revised slightly downward, and so have 
been the projected growth rates (due largely to unexpectedly sharp 
declines in fertility in the DCs, and failure of death rates to decline 
as rapidly as projected earlier). However, the general patterns of 
persistence of high growth rates in the LDCs through 1985, and only 
moderate declines thereafter, and the contrast between these levels and 
those for the DCs (at about half to a third of those for the LDCs) 
remain (see e.g., Table 1.1, p. 12). 
This brief sunnnary of UN population projections indicates 
that, even with substantial advance in modernization, a_realistic 
prognosis suggests continuation of high rates of population growth in 
the LDCs, peaking in the decade 1975-85 but remaining at fairly high 
levels to the end of the century, and exceeding the population growth 
rates in the DCs by wide margins. The possible consequence for the 
difference in growth rates of per capita product between the LDCs and 
the DCs, and the possible persistence and widening of the gap, is clear. 
